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Abstract	
The article is concerned with subsidiarity in Directive 2014/104 EU on actions for antitrust 
damages. After providing an overview of private enforcement of competition law and subsidiarity 
in EU law, it examines the arguments presented by the Commission in the relevant Impact 
Assessments. While most of the arguments were based on the need to prevent adverse cross-
border effects, of particular interest was the argument that Member States were slow or 
unresponsive in providing effective measures designed to compensate antitrust victims. 
Subsequently, it shows that the Commission’s assessment of the underlying problems was 
discretionary and played a pivotal role before the considerations on subsidiarity were made. On 
this basis, this article makes the case for subsidiarity to be understood as Member States’ 
constructive engagement in EU action, rather than constraint on EU action.  
 
Introduction 
This article examines the application of the principle of subsidiarity in Directive 2014/104 EU on 
actions for antitrust damages (Directive on damages actions). 1  This Directive introduced 
common provisions in substantive and procedural law applicable to antitrust claims made before 
Member States’ courts whose cause of action lies in the breach of Article 101 or 102 TFEU 
(hereinafter, ‘private enforcement’). In particular, this article shows the policy rationale presented 
by the Commission underpinning such harmonization. Before proceeding, it should be reminded 
that competition policy is one of the exclusive competences of the EU,2 which means that the 
principle of subsidiarity does not apply.3 Nonetheless, exclusive competence does not confer 
unlimited legal powers to take EU measures as a distinction should be made between a certain 
policy, which may be an exclusive competence of the Union, and its enforcement aimed at 
implementing the relevant rules.4 Indeed, the legal bases of the Directive are Articles 103 and 114 
TFEU and not Article 3 TFEU. It would be out of scope of this article to examine the 
appropriateness of such legal bases. For the present purposes, suffice it to say that private 
enforcement relies on contract and tort law on which the Union does not have competences.5 
However, as it will be seen later, the application of diverse national private laws is likely to give 
rise to adverse effects on the internal market, which prompt the legal basis of Article 114 TFEU.  
Subsidiarity is a constitutional requirement that must be met by EU legislation.6 Its application 
involves an assessment concerning the vertical allocation of the matter to be regulated (EU level 
rather than Member States). The literature on subsidiarity is extensive. From a political viewpoint, 
it is commonly accepted that subsidiarity was conceived as a means to constrain EU legislative 
                                                
1 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union. O.J. 2014,  L 349/1. 
2 Article 3.1(b) TFEU. 
3 Article 5(3) TEU. 
4 See for example Craig who argues that one thing is exclusive competence, quite another is the enforcement of a 
policy implementing such competence. Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, 160 (OUP 2010). 
5 For a comment on the relationship between tort law, legal basis and private enforcement, see Francisco Marcos and 
Alberto Sánchez Graells, Towards a European Tort Law? Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: Haronizing 
Tort Law through the Back Door?, 16 European Private Law Review 469 (2008) 
6 Article 5 TEU. 
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action.7 It has also been suggested that it could limit the interpretative functions of the Court of 
Justice.8 From an operative viewpoint, subsidiarity involves a control of rationality in policy-
making whereby the choice whether a matter should be regulated at the EU rather than national 
level should be made on the basis of its effectiveness, which has to do with how best to achieve a 
certain policy goal. Nonetheless this assessment is not value free since it presupposes the 
recognition of the problems to be addressed, the underpinning evidence, the way the issues at 
stake are framed and investigated, how various solutions are interpreted, and how decisions are 
taken under situations of uncertainty, the trade-offs involved in regulating the matter at national 
rather than EU level, and so forth. 
Generally speaking, legal scholars did not question the case for harmonization of procedural and 
substantive rules applicable to antitrust damages actions.10 However, some dissenting views 
highlighted the risks of abuses of collective actions, which would be inevitably part of the 
harmonisation programme,11 the adequacy of tort law to effectively cover all aspects of antitrust 
harm as well as the undesirability of a sectoral regulation of antitrust tortious liability,12 the 
superiority of public enforcement and the misalignment of private parties’ interest (as pursued in 
damages actions) with the general interest (as pursed by competition authorities).13 In addition, a 
legal scholar disagreed with harmonisation of such rules precisely on the basis of the subsidiarity 
principle arguing that national legal systems were better placed to enable consumers to claim 
antitrust damages.14 
In any case, the European Parliament15 and Member States16 did not raise any concerns about 
subsidiarity.  
                                                
7 Paul Craig, Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis, 50 JCMS 72 (2012). The Author identifies three rationales 
behind subsidiarity among which he mentions the goal to avoid excessive centralization’ 72-73. Since the 
introduction of subsidiarity in the EU, it was argued that its goal was to limit the power imbalance between 
Community and Member States. George Bermann, Taking subsidiarity seriously: federalism in the European Community and 
the United States, 94 Columbia Law Review 331, 335 (1994). 
8 Thomas Horsley, Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigsaw?, 50 JCMS 267 
(2012). 
10  See for example, Michael Dougan, National remedies before the Court of Justice, 202 (Hart 2004). Thomas 
Eilmansberger, The Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules and beyond: reflections on the utility and 
feasibility of stimulating private enforcement through legislative action, 44 CML Rev. 431, 438-439 (2007). Assimakis Komninos, 
New prospects for private enforcement of EC Competition Law: Courage v. Crehan and the community right to damages, 39 CML 
Rev. 447 (2002). 
11 Christopher Hodges, Competition enforcement, regulation and civil justice: what is the case?, 43 CML Rev. 1381 (2006). The 
Author wrote at the time of the Green Paper and disagreed on the Commission’s harmonization programme on the 
basis that antitrust litigation inevitably relies on collective actions, whose impact on the economy was deemed to be 
pernicious. 
12 Francisco Marcos and Alberto Sánchez Graells, Towards a European Tort Law? Damages Actions for Breach of the EC 
Antitrust Rules: Haronizing Tort Law through the Back Door?, 16 European Private Law Review 469 (2008),  
13 Wouter Wils, Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?, 26 World Competition 473 (2003). 
14 Jesu ́s Alfaro A ́guila-Real, Contra la armonizacio ́n positiva: la Propuesta de la Comisio ́n para reforzar el private enforcement del 
Derecho de la Competencia, 3 Rivista Para el Análisis del Derecho 1 (2009). 
15 The debate among the Members of the European Parliament was centred around the proposed rules. Some 
references were made to the principle of subsidiarity. See for example, Opinion of the Committee on Legal 
Affairs for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament on the Green Paper: 
Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules (2006/2207(INI) of 27.2.2007). There, the Committee asked 
the Commission to draft an Impact Assessment that would evaluate the legal basis and the compliance with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (point 3)). In another debate at committee level, when discussing the 
2005 Green Paper, the Committee on Legal Affairs made reference to the principle by asking the Commission to 
prepare an impact assessment (Point 27 of the motion of the European Parliament Resolution on Damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules (2006/2207(INI)).  
At http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A6-2007-
0133+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=ga#title1 (accessed 28 May 2015). In the resulting resolution, the 
European Parliament asked the Commission to prepare an impact assessment; however, it did not mention the 
principle of subsidiarity. Rather, it emphasised that the European Parliament should play a co-legislative role in 
competition law and that it should be kept informed on the bringing of such actions (European Parliament 
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Nonetheless, analysis of subsidiarity in Directive 2014/104 EU is still worthwhile for two 
reasons. First, private enforcement will result in important changes of domestic substantive and 
procedural law for damages actions. Thus both national policy-makers, in charge with the 
transposition of the directive, and domestic institutional actors, in charge with the application of 
the resulting rules (judges and lawyers), need to have a clear understanding of the reasons why 
EU action is appropriate. Second, analysis of the policy-documents and evidence underpinning 
the relevant legislative proposal show a new aspect relating to the application of subsidiarity (i.e., 
legislative inertia of Member States) that is not generally treated in EU literature on subsidiarity.  
This paper is structured as follows. First, it provides an overview of private enforcement of EU 
competition law and subsidiarity. Second, it critically examines the arguments about subsidiarity 
made by the Commission in the impact assessment accompanying Directive 2014/104 EU. Third 
is discusses the theory of regulatory competition in the context of private enforcement. Finally, it 
explores how the Commission treated the policy issues underpinning private enforcement and 
some aspects relating to the relationship between subsidiarity and proportionality. The findings 
of this paper confirm the view that if subsidiarity is seen as a principle to limit EU regulatory 
measures, then the principle is of limited utility. The Commission’s discretion in identifying the 
policy issues is unavoidable, which frames the terms within which the assessments required in the 
subsidiarity check are made. Rather, subsidiarity could exercise a more useful role by enabling 
Member States to provide factual evidence and contribute to identifying the most effective 
solution to deal with the problem identified by the Commission. Put differently, the article 
suggests an understanding of subsidiarity not simply as ‘constraint on EU action’, but also as 
‘engagement in the EU action’ to determine the optimal level of regulatory intervention.  
 
1. Background to private enforcement and its regulatory goals 
The Commission’s policy to encourage private enforcement dates back to the reform of public 
enforcement as set out in Council Regulation 1/2003. Although that Regulation was primarily 
concerned with public enforcement, it also conferred on the courts the power to apply Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU.17 In Courage v Crehan18 the Court contributed to the development of private 
enforcement by recognising the EU right of any individual to claim damages for losses caused by 
contract or conduct liable to restrict competition.19 Since Courage arose from a dispute between 
the contracting parties to an agreement contrary to Article 101 TFEU, it could have been argued 
that only contracting parties, not third parties, were entitled to compensation. The scope of the 
right to compensation was then clarified in Manfredi,20 which held that also third parties could 
claim compensation for the harm they suffered from an agreement or practice prohibited by 
Article 101 TFEU.21  With regard to the enforcement of the right to compensation, both 
judgements confirmed the principle of procedural autonomy according to which the domestic 
legal system has to provide the procedural rules for the enforcement of the right to compensation 
                                                                                                                                                   
resolution of 25 April 2007 on the Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 
(2006/2207(INI)). At <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-
2007-0152+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (accessed 28 May 2015). The fact that the European Parliament expressed 
the intention to be involved in the legislative process suggests that it believed that private enforcement rules had to 
be provided at the European level. 
16 COM/2015/0315 final, “Report from the Commission. Annual Report 2014 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality”. 
In such a report, the Commission the antitrust damages directive was not mentioned.  
17 Article 6, Regulation No 1/2003. O.J. 2003, L1/1. 
18 Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297. 
19 Para 26. 
20 Joined Cases C-295/04, C-296/04, C-297/04 and C-298/04 Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA 
and Others [2006] ECR I-6619. 
21 Para 61. 
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subject to the requirements of effectiveness and equivalence.22 Although the recognition of the 
EU right to antitrust compensation paved the way to more private enforcement, few antitrust 
claims were brought.23 The Commission attributed the low number of claims to the inadequacy 
of national law to ensure an effective enforcement of the right to antitrust compensation.24 On 
this basis, it undertook a programme of harmonization of some key rules on law of damages and 
procedural law, the outcome of which is the above-mentioned Directive on damages actions25 
and a Recommendation and Communication on Collective redress.26 
From Courage and Crehan, two main regulatory goals may be inferred. The first is the 
compensation of antitrust victims, expressed in the passage which held that any individual could 
claim damages for losses caused by a contract or conduct liable to distort competition.27 The 
second is deterrence, which was seen as an additional benefit of the right to compensation, where 
the Court held that the right to compensation discourages agreements and practices that are liable 
to distort competition.28 In this respect, the Court held that damages actions contribute to the 
maintenance of effective competition in the Union.29 Finally, the Court closely related this goal to 
guarantee the effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU, which promotes the working of competition 
law.30 This reasoning hinges on the assumption that the prospect of paying damages for the 
wrongdoer is an effective incentive to comply with EU law.  
The principle of effectiveness, with the two connected regulatory goals of compensation and 
deterrence, was relied on in Kone.31 In that case, some companies had entered into a cartel that 
resulted in higher prices for installation and maintenance of elevators in various Member States. 
Other companies, which were not party to such a cartel, relied on the cartelists’ prices to set their 
own prices above normal competitive conditions, a situation which is referred to as an ‘umbrella 
effect’. The referring court asked whether a claim could be made against the members of the 
cartel in respect of losses incurred when buying products from a non-member of the cartel. The 
legal issue at stake was the causal link, in particular whether it could be said that an 
anticompetitive agreement causes higher prices of the products subject to the agreement, or also 
causes higher prices of similar products sold by non-cartelists. The Court of Justice opted for the 
                                                
22 Courage para 29 and Manfredi para 62. Even before Courage the Court held the application of the principle of 
national procedural autonomy for the enforcement of EU rights deriving from provisions having direct effect: Case 
C-242/95 GT-Link A/S v De Danske Statsbaner (DSB) [1997] ECR I-4449, para 27. 
23 Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater and Gil Even-Shoshan (Ashrust), ‘Study on the conditions of claims for 
damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules: Comparative Report’ (2004) 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust /actionsdamages/study.html (accessed 28 May 2015). “Ashrust Report”. 
The study reported a low number of claims, at p. 1. (accessed 28 May 2015).  
24 COM (2005) 672 final, Commission Staff Working Paper. Annex to the Green Paper, “Damages Actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules”, at p. 12. 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html (accessed 28 May 2015). 
25 Numerous policy documents were enacted since 2005. It would be out of the scope of this article to illustrate 
them. Suffice it to mention the above-mentioned Green Paper, COM (2005) 672 final, “Green Paper, Damages 
actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules” and COM (2008) 165 final, “White paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules” and O.J. 2013 C167/19, “Commission Communication, Quantifying harm in 
actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union”  
26 COM (2013) 401 final, “Commission Communication, Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective 
Redress” and O.J. 2013 L201/60, “Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for 
injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law”. O.J. [2014] L349/1, “Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements 
of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union”. 
27 Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan, para 26. 
28 At para 27. 
29 ibid 
30 At para 27. 
31 Case C-557/12 Kone and Others v ÖBB-Infrastruktur [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:1317. 
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latter by relying on the principle of effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU.32 In broadening the basis 
of the economic relationships giving rise to antitrust compensation, the Court attributed the right 
to compensation to a wider class of claimants thus increasing the deterrent effect of damages 
claims.  
 
2. Subsidiarity in EU Law 
The TEU provides that ‘the use of Union competences is governed by the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality’.33 The principle of subsidiarity applies in areas that do not fall 
within the Union’s exclusive competences and requires an assessment of comparative efficiency 
between European and national measures in pursuing a certain objective; an EU measure should 
be adopted if its objective can be better attained at European level by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed actions.34 Protocol n. 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon provides that such an 
assessment must be supported by qualitative and quantitative indicators.35 Unlike the previous 
Protocol on the Treaty of Amsterdam, which provided some guidelines on how to interpret the 
principle of subsidiarity,36 the current protocol does not add any further criterion other than a 
reference to greater effectiveness of EU action due to its scale or effects. It has been argued that 
the Treaty text about the principle of subsidiarity contains two criteria: sufficiency and added-
value.37 The former provides that EU action is justified if its objectives cannot be achieved by the 
Member States. The latter holds that EU action is justified because it better achieves its 
objectives than the Member States. It has been suggested that the added-value criterion should be 
preferred. 38  Nonetheless, the interpretation and application of the principle of subsidiarity 
remains a difficult task. In general, subsidiarity has been interpreted as a constraint to EU 
intervention. 39  This is consistent with the account that subsidiarity was introduced in the 
Maastricht Treaty to balance possible federalist shifts.40 
Some EU legal scholars are sceptical about the ability of subsidiarity to determine who should 
accomplish a certain goal. On this basis, it has been proposed that the principle of 
proportionality is better suited than subsidiarity to allocate the level of regulatory intervention. In 
particular, it should be assessed whether the EU measure would result in a disproportionate 
intrusion into the Member States’ interests.41 To this view, it has been replied that the policy-
making process leading to the proposal of an EU measure de facto takes into account the impact 
on the Member States’ legal systems and autonomy. In addition, establishing when an EU 
measure is disproportionate in relation to Member States’ values is not an easy task.42 
 
 
                                                
32 Para 33. 
33 Article 5.1 TEU. 
34 Article 5.3 TEU. 
35 Article 5 of the Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to 
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by the Treaty of Lisbon 
of 13 December 2007. 
36 For example, the Amsterdam Protocol mentioned the issue of cross-border effects: ‘The issue under consideration 
has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by action by Member States’; it also made reference 
to the Treaty objectives: ‘Actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would conflict with the 
requirements of the Treaty (such as the need to correct distortion of competition or avoid disguised restrictions on 
trade or strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would otherwise significantly damage Member States’ 
interests’. The last guideline resembles what is now contained in Article 5 TEU: ‘Action at Community level would 
produce clear benefits by reason of its scale or effects compared with action at the level of the Member States.’ 
37 Antonio Estrella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and Its Critique, 93 (OUP 2002). 
38 Antonio Estrella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and Its Critique, 94 (OUP 2002). 
39 For a review of academic literature on subsidiarity, T. Horsley, Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing 
Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigsaw?, 50 JCMS, 267 (2012). 
40 Paul Craig, Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis, 50 JCMS 72, 73 (2012).  
41 Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, 43 CML Rev. 63, 71 (2006). 
42 Paul Craig, Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis, 50 JCMS 72, 83 (2012). 
 ‘Subsidiarity in Directive 2014/104 EU on damages actions for breach of EU competition law’ 6 
2.1 Selected recent case law of the Court of Justice on subsidiarity 
The Court of Justice is sometimes called upon to decide whether a certain EU measure breaches 
the principle of subsidiarity.  
In Vodafone43 the validity of Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 was disputed because of the lack of a 
legal basis and breaches of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. When deciding 
about subsidiarity, the Court took notice that a common approach to roaming charges was a 
contribution to the smooth working of the internal market. In particular, it took the view that the 
interdependence of retail and wholesale charges for roaming charges required a regulatory 
intervention at EU level in order to protect consumers. 44  The Court did not dwell on 
considerations about whether the Member States could achieve on their own the objective of 
protecting consumers from excessive roaming charges. Rather, the interconnectedness of 
markets seemed to be a sufficient factor to determine the appropriateness of an EU measure.  
The principle of subsidiarity is respected also in situations where the matter has a European 
dimension but there is no interdependence of the issues to be addressed. This is the case of 
administrative co-operation in the field of value added tax as provided by Regulation No 
1798/2003. In Commission v Germany, 45 the Court held that the effective administrative co-
operation for national authorities to combat tax evasion and tax avoidance was guaranteed if 
audits were carried out at the Union level. In other words, administrative co-operation among 
national authorities had a cross-border dimension, and in order to make it more effective, some 
EU rules were necessary.46  
Finally, an opinion of AG Jääskinen delivered in United Kingdom v Parliament47 seems to suggest a 
new justification of subsidiarity. The United Kingdom sought the annulment of some provisions 
of Directive 2013/36/EU relating to the setting of ratios between the fixed and variable 
components of the remuneration payable to employees of credit institutions and investment 
firms. One of the alleged grounds for annulment was breach of the principle of subsidiarity. In 
that respect, the AG took the view that if that matter had been left to the Member States, they 
would not have adopted proper remuneration policies against excessive risk taking. That would 
have created a risk of detrimental regulatory competition, which justified action at EU level.  
In summary, the above cases show that an important precondition for taking EU measures is the 
existence of a cross-border situation. It is not enough, though; as shown in Commission v Germany, 
it is still necessary to prove that EU action is more effective than national action. Vodafone shows 
that interdependence of economic factors makes a strong case for subsidiarity since what 
happens in one Member State affects other Member States. United Kingdom v Parliament was 
removed from the Register of the Court of Justice,48 but it is possible that the Advocate General’s 
argument on detrimental regulatory competition may be used in future cases to provide a 
justification of EU measures on the grounds that low national regulatory standards may lead 
other Member States not to take action.  
The Court of Justice has never invalidated an EU legislative act on the grounds of breach of 
subsidiarity, which can be explained as reluctance in interfering with the political judgement of 
the Union’s legislature.49 This has had likely repercussions on the interpretation of the criteria for 
                                                
43 Case C-58/2008 The Queen, on the application of Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform [2010] ECR I-4999. 
44 Paras 76 and 77. 
45 Case C-539/09, Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [2011] ECR I-11235. 
46 Para 84. 
47 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered on 20 November 2014 in Case C-507/13 United Kingdom v 
European Parliament. 
48  Order of the President of the Court of 9 December 2014. < 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=163769&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=re
q&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=457278 (Access 04 April 2016). 
49 See for example, the concern expressed by Tim Koopmans, a former judge of the Court of Justice. Tim 
Koopmans, Subsidiarity, Politics and the Judiciary, 1 EuConst 112, 116 (2005).  
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the application of subsidiarity: as the above three cases show, the Court of Justice has not 
adopted a principled approach to subsidiarity, especially in relation to the comparative efficiency 
calculus. Case law on subsidiarity does not mention the qualitative and quantitative indicators that 
must justify a draft legislative act.50 Rather, the Court’s assessment of the ‘added value’ of EU 
action has been made on a case-by-case basis. It is interesting to note that in Vodafone the Court 
of Justice expressly recognised the discretionary power of the Commission when making the 
assessments required in the principle of proportionality51 (suitability of the measure to achieve its 
goal, adoption of the least restrictive means, and so forth), with the limit that the Union 
legislature must base its choice on objective criteria. However, when the Court dealt with the 
principle of subsidiarity, it did not mention any discretionary power underpinning the assessment 
of the subsidiarity criteria. This omission is understandable (such discretionary powers would 
make the subsidiarity check meaningless), but it also implies that the comparative efficiency 
calculus should be based on objectively ascertainable criteria, which is consistent with the 
Protocol No. 3, which refers to quantitative and qualitative indicators. To some extent, this is 
also consistent with the view that the Court of Justice should become more involved in the 
assessments underpinning the subsidiarity check.52 Prof Biondi rejected the objection that this 
would mean a substitution of the Court’s judgement with that expressed by the EU political 
institutions. Rather, the Court could assess the evidence brought by the Commission to support 
the case for an EU regulatory measure. This is already possible as it is well established that while 
the Commission has a margin of discretion in complex economic matters, the Union Courts 
must establish that the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable, and consistent, and 
contains information capable of substantiating the conclusions concerning the assessment of 
such complex economic matters.53 Greater reliance on qualitative and quantitative indicators and 
‘minimization’ of Commission’s discretion would certainly make the subsidiarity check more 
vigorous; however many problems would remain unsolved. While it is possible to challenge the 
evidence relied on by the Commission to prove breach of the subsidiarity principle, the fact 
remains that on many occasions, the assessment of such evidence is still discretionary. In addition 
this would not solve the problem of inaction by the Member States to tackle a problem that has 
EU cross-border effects. This was precisely one of the issues concerning private enforcement, 
which will be examined later when dealing with the topic of the effectiveness of private 
enforcement.   
 
3. Overview of the Commission’s arguments on subsidiarity in private enforcement 
Compliance with the principle of subsidiarity is structured in such a way as to be ensured by the 
Commission at the earliest stage. The 2009 Impact Assessment Guidelines provide that one of 
the purposes of the Commission’s impact assessment is to check whether the principle of 
subsidiarity is respected.54  
In both the 200855 and 201356 Impact Assessment relating to private enforcement, the case for 
EU action was based on adverse consequences resulting from the diversity of the laws of 
                                                
50 Article 8 of the Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.   
51 Case C-58/2008 The Queen, on the application of Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform [2010] ECR I-4999, paras 52-53. 
52 Andrea Biondi, Subsidiarity in the Courtroom, 213 (Biondi, Eeckhout and Ripley, EU Law After Lisbon, OUP, 2012). 
53 This is a standard passage formulated in many cases concerning judicial review of complex economic matters. The 
Author refers to Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval, [2005] ECR I-987, para 39. 
54 SEC(2009) 92, Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines 2009, p. 6. Ideally, the principle of subsidiarity should 
be addressed in a section of the Impact Assessment Report together with the policy context and problem definition.  
55 COM(2008) 165 final, “Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying document to the White Paper on 
Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Impact Assessment”. At pp. 63-64. 
56 COM(2013) 404 final, “Commission  Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Report, Damages actions for 
breach of the EU antitrust rules accompanying the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union”. At pp. 66-67. Hereinafter: 2013 Impact Assessment. 
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damages and procedural frameworks. The argument was that such diversity created a disparity of 
judicial protection for antitrust victims, where some would benefit more and others less 
depending on the national legal framework applicable to an antitrust damages claim. Such 
diversity could also enable prospective defendants to engage in forum shopping thus minimising 
their liability and altering the level playing field of undertakings. In addition, the Commission 
highlighted the need to co-ordinate public and private enforcement, which could not have been 
achieved if each Member State had maintained their own rules. Finally, the Commission pointed 
out that Member States had been slow in providing an effective system of private enforcement, 
which made EU action desirable. 
 
Disparity of judicial protection 
The first argument for harmonization is that a diversity of legal systems leads to a disparity of 
judicial protection, which results in discrimination against some EU citizens. This claim is partly 
convincing as this outcome is the result of the application of the principle of national procedural 
autonomy. Let us recall that unless EU statutory law lays down procedural and remedial rules, the 
enforcement of EU rights before national courts is governed by national remedial and procedural 
rules. This division of tasks now has a constitutional recognition as it is established that ‘Member 
States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered 
by Union law’.57 Different procedural rules lead to different degrees of access to court. Similarly, 
different remedial rules lead to different substantive protection. In both situations, individuals 
who enforce an EU right before different national courts are likely to receive different judicial 
protection. Arguably, this situation may be criticised because different levels of judicial protection 
may result in discrimination against some EU citizens. However, EU law accepts such an 
outcome when it is the result of the application of national procedural and remedial rules. EU 
law’s response has not been to prescribe equal enforcement outcomes, but rather to establish a 
minimum standard of protection when individuals enforce EU rights before national courts, 
which is fulfilled by the requirements of effectiveness and equivalence. The effectiveness 
requirement provides that national law must not make the exercise of European rights impossible 
in practice or excessively difficult; whereas the equivalence requirement provides that national 
law applicable to enforce national rights shall also apply, in the same manner, to enforce EU 
rights of similar nature.58 The argument based on disparity of judicial protection would have 
more strength if the Commission had asserted that in the field of private enforcement, diversity 
of national procedural law would give rise to significant differences among EU citizens; however, 
given the low number of antitrust claims, there was little evidence to support this concern.  
 
Forum shopping 
Antitrust litigation is often complex. A constitutive requirement for an infringement of Article 
101 and 102 TFEU is the effect on trade, which means that anticompetitive agreements or abuses 
of dominant position must affect trade between Member States.60 Such a cross-border element 
makes it possible for a claim to be made in different Member States, a situation which gives rise 
to the opportunity to engage in forum shopping. Broadly speaking, forum shopping refers to a 
                                                
57 Article 19 TEU. 
58 Both requirements were established in Rewe where the Court of Justice held that national rules must not make 
‘impossible in practice’ the exercise of EU right (effectiveness requirement) and be less favourable than those 
relating to similar actions of a domestic nature (equivalence requirement). Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-
Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989. Subsequently, in Palmisani, the effectiveness 
requirement was worded as ‘virtually impossible or excessively difficult’. See Case C-261/95 Palmisani v INPS [1997] 
ECR I-4025, para 27. 
60 O.J. 2004, C101/81, “Commission Notice, Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 
82 of the Treaty”. For early cases, Cases 56/64 and 58/84 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299 and Case 
6/73 and 7/73, Commercial Solvents v Commission, [1974] ECR 223 for anticompetitive agreement and abuse of 
dominant position respectively. 
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situation in which a claim can be made alternatively before courts located in different 
jurisdictions, the choice of which is motivated by a possible advantage conferred by the legal 
system over another.61 The ‘strategic’ choice of the jurisdiction may also be determined by the 
likely duration of civil proceedings. In this case, a defendant may attempt to seize a court in those 
states where proceedings are lengthy and many years elapse before a ruling is given. According to 
Regulation No 44/2001, the competent court is the one where the defendant has its domicile62 or 
the one located in the place where the harmful event occurs.63 Given that competition law 
infringements often result in widespread losses that materialise in different countries, the place of 
occurrence of the harmful event entails that many Member States’ national courts might be 
competent to deal with an antitrust claim. In addition, an anti-competitive agreement necessarily 
requires two or more undertakings, which gives rise to a joint liability of the concerned 
undertakings. As a result a claim may be made against multiple defendants, which can be sued in 
the place of the domicile of any of the defendants.64  
Different jurisdictions may also come into play in relation to contractual obligations. In such 
cases, Regulation No 44/2001 provides that the forum is the place of performance of the 
obligation.65 Vertical agreements and some abuses of dominant position involve a contract 
between undertakings, which operate at different levels of the production or distribution process. 
In particular, a distribution agreement provides obligations for the manufacturer (sale of its 
products) and distributor (purchase of the manufacturer’s products and sale in a designated 
territory), which are often to be performed in different countries. Accordingly, different courts 
may be seized. As for the determination of the substantive law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations, the general rule is that the law applicable is that of the country where damage 
occurs.66 Specific rules apply in relation to non-contractual obligations arising out of an act of 
unfair competition. In this case, the applicable law will be that of the country where competitive 
relations of the collective interest of consumers are, or are likely to be, affected.67 Particular 
provisions are also laid down for non-contractual obligations resulting from a restriction of 
competition.68 In this case, the applicable law is that of the country where the market is, or is 
likely to be, affected.69  
Competition law practitioners have recognised that forum shopping has become an inherent part 
of competition litigation.70 It is also submitted that claimants may put in place strategies to 
counter pre-emptive litigation by defendants.71 However, given the possibility of multiple fora, it 
                                                
61 Forum shopping has been defined as ‘the process of attempting to have an action tried in a particular jurisdiction 
where it is felt that one will receive the most favourable judgement or verdict’. Franco Ferrari, “Forum shopping” despite 
international uniform contract law conventions, 51 I.C.L.Q. 689, 706 (2002). 
62 O.J. 2001, L12/1, “Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters”, art 2.1. 
63 Council Regulation 44/2001, art 5.3.  
64 Council Regulation 44/2001, art 6. 
65 Council Regulation 44/2001, art 5.1. 
66 O.J. 2007, L199/40, “Regulation (EC) 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II)” 
art 4.1. 
67 Regulation (EC) 864/2007, art 6.1. 
68 Restriction of competition refers to Article 101 and 102 TFEU. James Fawcett, Janeen Carruthers & Peter North, 
Cheshire, North & Fawcett, Private International Law, 811 (14th ed., OUP 2008). 
69 Regulation (EC) 864/2007, art 6.3(a). 
70 Stothers, Gardner, and Hinchliffe, Forum shopping and “Italian torpedoes” in competition litigation in the English court, 4 
(2011) Global Competition Litigation Review, 67-73. 
71 Charles Balmain and Vera Coughlan, More haste less speed: the evolving practice in competition damages actions in the UK, 4 
Global Competition Litigation Review 147 (2011). A typical example of pre-emptive litigation is the so-called 
‘torpedo action’ whereby a prospective defendant brings an action in a favourable jurisdiction seeking for a 
declaration that it did not breach competition law or its conduct did not cause any damages (negative declaratory 
relief).  
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is plausible to assume that defendants will continue to put in place successful strategies to escape, 
minimise or delay a finding of liability.72 
 
Forum shopping gives rise to a number of undesirable consequences. The first is the risk of 
minimization of liability. If a company has business operations in different Member States and is 
going to face multiple lawsuits, it will attempt to seize a court in a jurisdiction whose legal system 
would reduce liability compared to other countries in which it could equally be sued and incur 
higher liability. As a result, the company increases the chance of minimising its liability. This 
outcome is undesirable because it reduces the deterrent effect of antitrust litigation, which is one 
of the goals of private enforcement. Harmonization of private enforcement reduces such risk, 
though it has some limits in cases where undertakings seek to seize a jurisdiction whose civil 
justice system is slow and inefficient in order to delay a finding of antitrust liability. Harmonised 
rules would not be able to prevent this outcome.  
A second undesirable consequence is the alteration of the level playing field. Level playing field 
refers to a legal environment in which competitors may compete under the same conditions. An 
important factor affecting the level playing field is the diversity of legal systems, which results in 
different regulatory duties, liability standards, etc. Rules regulating antitrust litigation contribute 
to the equality of competitive conditions. For example, different rules on determination and 
quantification of antitrust damages give rise to different amounts of compensation, which has an 
impact on the financial capability of a company to compete in the future. The achievement of a 
perfect regulatory level playing field is illusory as this would require applying identical rules on 
taxation, labour law, etc. However, achieving a minimum level playing field in antitrust 
enforcement is still desirable especially when harmonization costs are not excessive.73 
 
Co-ordination of public and private enforcement 
Public and private enforcement do not necessarily interact with each other, but the reality is that 
they often do. Regulation No 1/2003 laid down some rules concerning private enforcement,74 
but did not make detailed provisions for all possible aspects. Indeed, a particular issue that arose 
during the policy-making of private enforcement was when third parties (i.e. would-be claimants) 
asked to access information held by antitrust agencies and that had been obtained through the 
execution of leniency programmes. Sometimes public authorities refused such a request because 
it might deter other undertakings from applying for such programmes as it would ultimately 
provide their victims with evidence to be used in civil liability actions. In Hydrogene Peroxide,75 the 
General Court seemed open to allowing disclosure of such evidence as it argued that prohibiting 
access to such information on the grounds that it jeopardises leniency applications would lead to 
the conclusion that any document held by the Commission should not be disclosed.76 However, 
on similar facts, the decision was different. In Pfleiderer77the applicant requested to the German 
competition authority for access of documents, which had been obtained through a leniency 
                                                
72 For an example of an action seeking a negative declaratory relief: Cooper Tire & Rubber Co Europe Ltd v Shell 
Chemicals UK Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 864; [2010] Bus. L.R. 1697 (CA (Civ Div)).  
73 The Final Report indicates the costs resulting from the adoption of common rules (e.g. group litigation). Although 
it does not quantify such costs, they would they would occur only once, that is to say when national rules are 
reformed or introduced in order to implement the Damages Directive. Renda, Peysner, Riley, Rodger, Van Den 
Bergh, Keske, Pardolesi, Camilli, and Caprile, “Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare 
impact and potential scenarios. Final Report” (2007). <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/ 
actionsdamages/documents.html> (last visited: 28 May 2015). Hereinafter “the Final Report”. 
74 For example, Article 6 provides that national courts shall have the power to apply Article 101 and 102 TFEU. 
Article 15 makes provisions for co-operation between national courts and the Commission or competition 
authorities. Article 16 prohibits national courts to take decisions running counter a Commission’s decision and avoid 
giving decisions that would conflict with a Commission’s decision to be taken in pending proceedings.  
75 Case T-437/08 CDC Hydrogene Peroxide Cartel Damage Claims v Commission [2011] ECR II-8251. 
76 Para 70. 
77 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-05161. 
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procedure. The Court of Justice held that a balance between the effectiveness of leniency 
programmes and the effectiveness of the right to compensation had to be struck on a case-by-
case basis, according to national law.78 As the assessment had to be made on a case-by-case basis, 
the Commission was concerned about the resulting legal uncertainty,79 which justified EU rules 
on this matter.80 
As the Commission pointed out, Pfleiderer was already creating divergent solutions among 
Member States’ courts.81 Allowing a situation where some Member States permit disclosure and 
others do not would have jeopardised a coherent strategy of public enforcement carried out by 
national competition authorities. Thus, uniform EU rules were necessary to avoid this outcome.  
Different treatments of access to information obtained in the execution of leniency programmes 
was not the only problem. At a deeper level what was at stake was the priority to be given when 
in some instances the needs of public and private enforcement conflict with each other. In 
particular, effective private enforcement would have made desirable to allow would-be claimants 
to have access to the files of competition authorities as the information therein contained might 
provide compelling evidence on infringements of competition law. However, this solution would 
have jeopardised the working of two sensitive areas of public enforcement, such as leniency 
programmes and settlement procedures. As mentioned above, prospective applicants would be 
reluctant to submit sensitive documents to a competition authority if they know that such 
documents may be disclosed and used in civil proceedings. Directive 2014/104 EU rejected this 
solution and strikes a balance by distinguishing between two types of evidence.82 The first relates 
to leniency applications and settlement submissions, which cannot at any time be disclosed; the 
second relates to other information prepared by a natural or legal person for the proceedings of a 
competition authority, information drawn up by a competition authority and sent to the parties in 
the course of the proceedings, and settlements submissions that have been withdrawn. This 
second type of information may be disclosed after the competition authority has closed its 
proceedings.  
 
Effectiveness of private enforcement 
The last argument presented by the Commission was that Member States had been slow to 
reform their system of private enforcement to ensure the victims’ right to antitrust 
compensation. Effectiveness has different meanings, but in this context it is plausible to refer to 
the requirement that national law must not make the exercise of Union rights virtually impossible 
or excessively difficult.83 This reading is confirmed by the fact that Directive 104/2014 also refers 
to this type of effectiveness.84 The assertion that Member States have been slow in putting in 
place effective private enforcement rules seems to be justified: Courage and Crehan was issued in 
September 2001 and in 2013 the Commission noticed that many Member States did not yet have 
effective rules on private enforcement.85 While in the previous Commission’s policy documents 
the main rationale behind harmonization was the adverse effects resulting from diversity of the 
national legal systems, in the 2013 Impact Assessment the Commission’s focus was on the 
ineffectiveness of the Member States’ domestic laws. From a quantitative viewpoint, the 2004 
Ashurst Report found that only 60 judgments on competition law had been decided, of which 28 
judgements resulted in an award.86 This provided support for the Commission’s claim that 
                                                
78 Paras 31 and 32. 
79 2013 Impact Assessment at p. 14. 
80 Directive 104/2014 now provides that national courts cannot at any time order a party or third party to disclose 
leniency statements and settlement submissions (Article 6.6). 
81 2013 Impact Assessment at p. 14. 
82 Article 6. 
83 See above footnote 59. 
84 Article 4. 
85 2013 Impact Assessment, at p. 43, paras 129-130. 
86 “Ashrust Report” at p. 1. 
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Member States’ laws were not effective. However, empirical research covering the period 1999 to 
2009 found a mixed picture of competition law cases, where there was more litigation in some 
Member States than others.87 From a qualitative viewpoint, the assessment is more difficult but 
the existence of more cases brought in some jurisdictions than others seems to confirm that 
diversity of legal rules created a situation of unequal enforcement across the Member States. In 
addition, the research highlighted that there had been almost no small-value mass consumer 
claims based on competition law,88 which lends support to the Commission’s claim that the law 
of some Member States was not effective. The above findings confirm the Commission’s 
assertion that Member States did not have an effective system of private enforcement. The point 
is however whether Member States’ inaction justifies EU measures. Put differently: is Member 
States’ slowness in their regulatory intervention sufficient to justify the EU added value or is it 
simply an extra argument that reinforces the case for EU action established on the basis of other 
arguments? 
The issue may be rephrased in terms of the basis of assessment for the comparative efficiency 
calculus. Should it be based on past national regulatory failures or is it sufficient to make an ex-
ante assessment of the likelihood of Member States to provide effective enforcement policies? 
Arguing that national regulatory delay is itself sufficient to justify EU action seems excessive: 
given the constitutional centrality of subsidiarity, more arguments for EU action are probably 
desirable. Nonetheless, waiting for national policies to be ineffective before taking action at EU 
level is also undesirable. First, the Commission should provide an input to the Member States, 
asking them to put in place new measures, or amend existing national rules, in order to 
accomplish a certain goal. Then Member States’ action should be assessed. In the case of negative 
assessment or Member States’ inaction, EU measures would finally be justified. This latter way of 
proceeding has the shortcoming that during this process some adverse effects of national 
regulatory failure might materialise and affect other Member States. Thus, one may wonder why 
wait for national regulatory failures, when it can be reasonably foreseen that EU action is likely to 
be more effective and such failures are likely to affect other Member States. After all, 
effectiveness may also be assessed not only in terms of the ability of a policy to achieve a specific 
goal, but also in terms of how expeditious a regulatory response is. To some extent, this was the 
Commission’s way of proceeding in relation to collective redress, where the Commission has 
enacted some soft law and will assess the Member States’ implementation in 2017. On that basis, 
it will consider whether to enact further measures.89 While this strategy is respectful of Member 
States’ regulatory autonomy, one may wonder about the adverse consequences that consumers 
will suffer meanwhile from the lack of adequate national legislation.  
In the case of private enforcement of competition law, the goals of avoiding forum shopping and 
co-ordination of public and private enforcement show the added-value of EU rules. Nonetheless, 
it cannot be ruled out that in the future there might be some instances where Member States may 
themselves be able to provide rules that accomplish a certain European policy goal, but be too 
slow in doing so. The above-mentioned case, United Kingdom v Parliament seems to be a good 
example where the Member State does not have the incentive to carry out reforms, which in turn 
dissuades other Member States from carrying out reforms in the fear that if they regulate a certain 
matter, then those adversely affected by such regulation will move to a jurisdiction which had not 
regulated it. This point will be elaborated in the next section.  
 
                                                
87 Competition Law Comparative Private Enforcement & Consumer Redress in the EU. The research was led by 
Professor Barry Rodger and funded by the Art and Humanities Research Council. The reports are available at:  
http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/default.htm (accessed 28 May 2015). 
88  Findings presented at Conference 15 September 2012 at LSE, London, at 
http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/default.htm (accessed 28 May 2015). 
89 O.J. 2013 L201/60, “Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under 
Union Law”, para 41. 
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4. Regulatory competition in private enforcement? 
The previous paragraph showed that EU private enforcement rules were introduced also to 
overcome Member States’ legislative inertia. However, this motivation could be challenged on the 
basis that harmonization is undesirable because it prevents Member States from experimenting 
with new legal solutions that could make private enforcement more effective than that resulting 
from EU harmonization. Indeed, the introduction of substantive and procedural rules applicable 
to antitrust damages actions will constrain national courts’ jurisdiction.90 Directive 2014/104/EU 
provides some rules regulating the effects of national competition authorities’ findings on 
national courts,91 or limiting national courts’ power to disclosure evidence held by competition 
authorities obtained from leniency applications or settlement submissions.92 While the rationale 
behind these rules is to co-ordinate national competition authorities and national courts, they will 
also limit national policy-makers’ room for manoeuvre to introduce more effective rules that 
could facilitate damages claims.  
This challenge may be conceptualised through the theory of regulatory competition, which was 
elaborated by US scholarship.93 Broadly speaking, it holds that local policy-makers compete to 
attract businesses, investments, and other productive factors by offering a favourable jurisdiction 
characterised by minimum legal requirements for businesses. Such a competition forces policy-
makers to devise a legal system devoid of unnecessary regulatory burdens, which makes their 
jurisdiction hospitable to businesses and whose outcome is the creation of an efficient legal 
environment. It follows that not only is the introduction of uniform rules across all jurisdictions 
unnecessary, but it is also undesirable because it prevents local policy-makers from experimenting 
with new rules leading to the creation of an efficient legal system. This theory is controversial on 
different grounds. First, it can be questioned whether policy-makers engage in such regulatory 
competition. After all, legal traditions still play an important role. Second, it can be questioned 
whether such regulatory competition leads to an efficient legal system (race to the top) or, rather, 
gives rise to regulatory failures that adversely affect some stakeholders (race to the bottom).94 In 
the US a great deal of literature on regulatory competition has been developed in the field of 
corporate law, but there have been attempts to apply it also in relation to antitrust. 
The theory of regulatory competition has never been fully embraced by EU legal scholars,95 
perhaps because in the EU the most pressing need was to build the internal market, which also 
required levelling different national rules and legal standards that would hinder the freedom of 
movement of goods and services. However, it is worth asking whether regulatory competition 
would be desirable in the field of private enforcement of competition law in order to facilitate 
victims of breach of competition law making a claim. It is difficult to make an accurate prediction 
of what Member States would do; however, some scepticism is warranted.  
First of all, it is doubtful that all EU national policy-makers engage in a competition to offer the 
most favourable jurisdiction to make antitrust claims. In some Member States antitrust litigation 
                                                
90 Kathryn Wright, The Ambit of Judicial Competence after the EU Antitrust Damages Directive, 43 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 15 (2016). 
91 Article 9. 
92 Article 6(6). See above on the co-ordination between public and private enforcement. 
93 US literature on regulatory competition is extensive. The seminal contribution to this theory was Charles Tiebout, 
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 Journal of Political Economy 416 (1956). 
94 Lucian Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: the Desirable Limits of Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv.L.Rev. 
1435 (1992); Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv.L.Rev. 588 (2003); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some 
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 225 (1985); Marcel Kahan and Ehud 
Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 Stan.L.Rev. 679 (2002).  
95 For some exceptions, Anthony Ogus, Competition between national legal systems: a contribution of economic analysis to 
comparative law, 48 ICLQ, 405 (1999), or Damien Geradin, Competition between rules and rules of competition: a legal and 
economic analysis of the proposed modernization of the enforcement of EC competition law, 9 Colum. J. Eur. L. 1 (2002).  
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seems more present,96 but this does not necessarily mean that policy-makers reformed some 
procedural rules in order to create an efficient legal system or to encourage antitrust litigation.  
A second critical point concerns whether national policy-makers are better suited to enact 
effective rules on private enforcement. In theory it could be argued that Member States’ policy-
makers could benefit from the positive experience developed by some Member States, or from 
regulatory failures that have occurred in other Member States, or from their experiments with 
new legal solutions. However, as shown above, past experience shows that that has not been the 
case.97 Empirical research on private enforcement98 found that competition law litigation took 
place among businesses in commercial disputes and in which violations of competition law were 
used as a defence rather than cause of action to claim compensation. The research also found 
that civil procedure national rules and national cultures affect litigation rates. Finally, there were 
almost no small-value mass consumer claims based on competition law.99 This calls into question 
that policy-makers make legal reforms to offer a jurisdiction hospitable to competition law 
claims. In fact the opposite risk should be highlighted. Antitrust litigation is costly both for the 
civil justice system and for undertakings condemned to pay damages and legal costs. The risk is 
that policy-makers may prefer to put in place unfavourable litigation rules for consumers for the 
fear of exposing companies to significant antitrust liability. This may be the case when policy-
makers are lobbied by big corporations who are able to exert greater pressure than consumers. 
Put differently, instead of protecting consumers, the category most adversely affected by antitrust 
violations, policy-makers may adopt a ‘pro-business’ attitude by not encouraging antitrust 
litigation or other forms of consumer redress. This possibility underlines the flawed assumption 
of the theory of regulatory competition, which holds that policy-makers are rational actors where 
‘rationality’ consists in the goal of creating an efficient legal system for the benefits of antitrust 
victims. This is ultimately an empirical matter and it depends on cultural, social and political 
factors.  
Finally, with regard to the argument that the preservation of Member States’ diversity in their 
systems of private enforcement enables some Member States to experiment with new solutions100 
by learning from the experience of ‘successful’ Member States, it can be countered that the EU 
rules provided in Directive 104/2014 and the soft law on collective redress were not formulated 
in a vacuum, rather they are the outcome of a numerous stakeholder consultations in which the 
limitations of domestic procedural and substantive laws of damages were discussed. The current 
legal framework of private enforcement is not the result of a ‘market approach’ to policy-making, 
which underlies the theory of regulatory competition; rather it is the outcome of a wide 
consultation process, which also saw the participation of expert stakeholders who will be affected 
by private enforcement.101 In such consultations, both open and targeted, stakeholders provided a 
                                                
96 The Commission reported that United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands were the jurisdictions where the 
vast majority of antitrust actions were brought. 2013 Impact Assessment, at p. 19. Other findings were presented in a 
conference in 2012 at the London School of Economics, London, which showed that in Germany, Spain, France, 
UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Sweden more actions than previously thought had been brought.  
http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/ConferenceReport.pdf (accessed 1 July 2015). 
97 2013 Impact Assessment, at p. 66. 
98 The research is called ‘Comparative private enforcement & consumer redress in the EU’ and was carried out by a 
team led by principal investigator Professor Barry Rodger. It was funded by the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council. 
99 http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/ConferenceReport.pdf (accessed 1 July 2015). 
100 With regard to collective redress, Hodges took a similar stance as in 2008 he noted that Member States were 
experimenting and evaluating their collective redress mechanisms thus making harmonization undesirable. 
Christopher Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in the European Legal Systems, 181 (Hart 2008). 
101 Consultations on Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, held from 20 December 
2005 to 21 April 2006 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/green_paper_comments.html 
and on the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules held from 3 April to 15 July 2008  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments.html (accessed 28 May 2015). 
In addition, in 2007 targeted consultations were held with experts from Member States representing ministries of 
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great deal of evidence about national civil proceedings, national procedural rules, problems 
encountered in the enforcement of the right to antitrust compensation, and so forth. The amount 
and quality of the information provided in those consultations are equally valuable to creating an 
effective system of private enforcement. There is no reason to think that transplanting successful 
rules from other Member States was better than the current EU framework on private 
enforcement, which is the outcome of a collaborative effort shared among a great number of 
stakeholders.  
 
5. Subsidiarity and the Commission’s policy discretion 
The previous sections examined separately the arguments for subsidiarity. This section attempts 
to broaden the view on the whole policy issues at stake in private enforcement. In particular, the 
argument presented here is that in competition law there are some policy considerations that 
should be made prior to the subsidiarity analysis. On the surface subsidiarity requires determining 
the most effective level of regulatory intervention. However, the answer to this question depends 
on the policy goals assigned to private enforcement and on the best type of regulatory 
intervention to achieve such goals. These considerations affect the framing of the issues and how 
to address them. Only once these problems are defined, does subsidiarity come into play in order 
to identify the best level of intervention. Put simply: before deciding who should do it, first it 
must be decided what should be done.102 
As expounded above, the two primary goals of private enforcement are compensation of 
antitrust victims and deterrence. While the Court of Justice recognised the existence of these two 
goals in Courage, the Commission took the initiative to implement them in such a way as to make 
private enforcement consistent with the Commission’s enforcement action. The Commission was 
entitled to take such an initiative given that competition policy is one of the exclusive 
competences of the EU. On this basis, the Commission decided how best to pursue 
compensation and deterrence by detecting the problem to be addressed (antitrust victims 
remained largely uncompensated), the sources of the problem (inadequacy of the national 
procedural framework in relation to the peculiarities of antitrust damages actions) and the extent 
of the problem (quantification of antitrust losses suffered by antitrust victims).103 With regard to 
this latter aspect, in the 2013 Impact Assessment the Commission estimated that the welfare 
losses resulting from price-fixing agreements ranged between €13 billion and €37 billion and their 
detection rate was 15%. In addition, price-fixing agreements producing effects on national 
markets were estimated to be between €25 billion and €69 billion.104 Such figures were drawn 
from an expert report, which provided a great number of estimates in relation to both anti-
competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position.105 These figures showed the magnitude 
of the infringements of EU competition law, which in turn justified the need to increase the 
deterrent impact of private enforcement. It is submitted that these aspects were pivotal in the 
design of private enforcement and it is where the Commission could exercise discretion in its 
broadest form by deciding that private enforcement was the best available policy to accomplish 
such goals. 
                                                                                                                                                   
justice, ministries of economic affairs, of national competition authorities. A delegation of national judges was also 
heard. 2013 Impact Assessment, at p. 6. 
102 However, the Better Regulation Guidelines 2015, set out the order differently as the first step is the identification 
of the problem, the second is why the EU should act, and the third is what should be achieved. COM(2015) 215 
final, “Commission Staff Working Document. Better Regulation Guidelines”, pp. 18-21. 
103 Indeed, these operations must be carried out in the preparation of the Impact Assessment. See COM(2015) 215 
final, “Commission Staff Working Document. Better Regulation Guidelines”, pp. 16-17.  
104 2013 Impact Assessment, at p. 22. Welfare losses included the overcharge (i.e. higher prices paid by consumers as 
a result of the price-fixing agreements) and deadweight losses (consumers’ forgone benefits or inefficient 
substitutions incurred due to such agreements). 
105 The Final Report 71-127. 
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After this first stage of ‘broad policy discretion’, the aspect of the most suitable rules to achieve 
such goals had to be dealt with. Directive 2014/104 made provisions for inter alia disclosure of 
evidence,106 including that held by a competition authority,107 joint and several liability,108 passing-
on defence,109 indirect purchaser standing,110 and quantification of harm.111 Rules on collective 
redress have been deliberately excluded from the Directive and are contained in the above-
mentioned Recommendation and Communication on collective redress112 and have been laid 
down as general principles rather than specific rules. All these rules have been formulated with a 
view to addressing the problems typical of antitrust litigation (e.g. hidden evidence, overcharge 
passed on down to the distribution chain, and so forth). As such, they may be understood in light 
of their ability to provide a legal framework facilitating antitrust litigation, which amounts to the 
limb of the test of the proportionality principle, which examines the suitability of a measure to 
achieve its end. It would be out of the scope of this paper to analyse the contents of these rules 
and whether they are adequate to promote antitrust compensation and deterrence; however, 
reference to proportionality brings us back to the argument presented by Davies,113 who argued 
that this principle is better suited than subsidiarity to deal with the division of competences 
between EU and Member States. Craig disagreed arguing, inter alia, that this approach alters the 
role of the principle of proportionality and creates the same problems encountered by the Court 
of Justice when adjudicating on subsidiarity.114  
The aspects concerning the best policy tool to promote compensation and deterrence (i.e. private 
enforcement) and the relevant rules set out in Directive 2014/14 and the soft-law on collective 
redress have to do with ‘what should be done’. It was only after these aspects were decided that it 
was possible to identify who should put in place such rules. The fact that the EU was better 
suited to putting in place such measures was the consequence of how the Commission framed 
the above-mentioned policy issues concerning the problems to be addressed, the evidence 
concerning such problems, and so forth. Inevitably, a great deal of discretion underpinned the 
elaboration of such issues. If this reading is correct, then the view that subsidiarity raises too 
many expectations is confirmed. As Davies submitted, subsidiarity does not provide any 
indication about the broad policy goal to be achieved and the relative means. Not surprisingly the 
Commission’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board (previously, the ‘Impact Assessment Board’) often 
refrains from offering legal interpretations of subsidiarity on the Commission’s legislative 
proposals, and instead it asks to better specify why EU action is needed.115 With regard to the 
legislative proposal leading to Directive 2014/104 EU, the Impact Assessment Board did not 
express any concerns about subsidiarity.116 
It may be tempting to be sceptical about the utility of subsidiarity. Against this view, two 
arguments may be made. First, the Commission’s new Better Regulation programme provides 
that the added value of EU measures will be subject to evaluation,117 which will focus on a 
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qualitative analysis of the change brought about by the EU measures. The Commission is aware 
that the analysis of the added value is problematic due to the difficulties in identifying a counter-
factual.118 Evaluating EU measures of private enforcement will be made on the basis of empirical 
data comparing competition law damages actions pre-Directive with post-implementation of the 
Directive to determine what changes the Directive has brought.119 It is difficult to predict the 
impact of such evaluation exercise on subsidiarity and in particular whether it will result in the 
Commission proposing to transfer back some aspects currently regulated by the Directive on 
damages actions.120 However, whatever the outcome, the epistemic basis for the assessment of 
subsidiarity will be comprehensive. Previously, the assessments underpinning subsidiarity were 
prospective: the starting point was the inadequacy of Member States to achieve a certain goal and 
the EU regulatory measures were formulated with the expectation that they would achieve such 
goal. From now, the subsidiarity assessment will be prospective and retrospective. The 
expectation of the enhanced effectiveness of EU regulatory measures will be tested against the 
concrete effects brought about by such measures. In this latter respect, Member States will be 
able to provide important information on whether an EU measure had added-value. 
The second argument maintaining the significance of subsidiarity is that the Commission still has 
an obligation to present arguments and evidence that the EU measures have added-value. The 
fact that this is done in the impact assessment, that is to say in the early stage of the legislative 
process, enables the European and national Parliaments to exercise control. In fact, these political 
institutions are better placed to carry out the subsidiarity check than the Court of Justice, which, 
as seen above, seems to be reluctant to call into questions the Commission’s policy 
considerations concerning the most appropriate level of regulatory effectiveness. As mentioned 
above, national Parliaments are already entitled to raise concerns over the lack of subsidiarity.121 
It is precisely in this context that they could present other evidence complementing that 
produced by the Commission. Both arguments show that Member States’ involvement may be 
significant, which promotes a richer understanding of subsidiarity. Although national Parliaments 
have broad and differing views of the meaning of subsidiarity,122 the common element is the 
concern that the Commission is encroaching on national competences. Instead, a constructive 
approach is that rather than considering subsidiarity as a means to retain domestic regulatory 
powers, it could be seen as an opportunity for Member States to engage in the legislative process 
by bringing their own evidence and expertise and identifying the most effective solution to a 
specific problem. To some extent, this was the case during the preparatory works for the 
Directive on damages actions, when the Commission met with ministerial and competition 
authorities’ experts of the Member States.123 Member States also submitted their observations 
during the online consultations on the Green Paper124 and the White Paper.125 Although the 
Commission did not report how such informational input was used, it is plausible that Member 
States provided important information that enhanced the quality of the legislation on private 
enforcement, thus contributing to give added-value to the Directive on damages actions. Yet, 
such Member State engagement was incomplete, as national Parliaments limited themselves to 
not raising concerns on breach of subsidiarity under above-mentioned Protocol No 1. This 
                                                
118 Ibid. 
119 Indeed, this was already provided by the Directive on damages actions, which prescribes the Commission to 
produce a report on the working of these rules and, if appropriate, to present a legislative proposal (Article 20). 
120 The ‘Commission Staff Working Document. Better Regulation Guidelines’ state that where there is little evidence 
of the EU added value of an intervention, consideration should be given to its repeal, at p 60. 
121 O.J. 2004, C/310/204. “Protocol (No 1) on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union”. 
122 COM(2013) 566 final, “Report from the Commission, Annual Report 2012 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality”.  
123 IA 2013 p 6. 
124  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/green_paper_comments.html (accessed 22 
September 2015). 
125  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments.html (accessed 22 
September 2015). 
 ‘Subsidiarity in Directive 2014/104 EU on damages actions for breach of EU competition law’ 18 
should prompt an important reflection. EU policy-making can no longer be seen as a top-down 
approach: evidence-based policy-making requires information of domestic legislation. As the 
2008 and 2013 IA on damages action shows, such information was provided by representatives 
of the executives of the Member States, national competition authorities, some judges and private 
stakeholders, the latter predominantly represented by businesses. In other words, the advocated 
engagement in the legislative process came from many actors, public and private, but not from 
national Parliaments, the closest representatives of EU citizens. Arguably, the understanding of 
subsidiarity as a constraint of EU action was partly to blame, which shows the appropriateness of 
moving towards a broader conception of subsidiarity, which also includes a positive engagement 
with the Commission.   
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper made an analytical assessment of the Commission’s arguments about subsidiarity on 
private enforcement and how the Commission framed the policy issues underlying private 
enforcement. The argument to limit forum shopping and ensure some degree of a level playing 
field can be understood within the traditional rationale of internal market governance. The need 
to ensure proper co-ordination between public and private enforcement has to do with the fact 
that the Commission and, in some instances, national competition authorities enforce EU 
competition law. In this respect, of particular importance is the disclosure of evidence held by a 
competition authority for the purposes of bringing damages actions. Directive 2014/104 
provides absolute protection from disclosure of leniency applications and settlement 
submissions, and temporary protection of other information produced in the course of antitrust 
administrative proceedings. These provisions show the Commission’s intention to repeal 
Pfleiderer126 and in particular to preserve two areas of public enforcement (leniency statements and 
settlement submissions) as fully operative and attractive for potential applicants. However, apart 
from these two exceptions, private parties will be able to obtain other evidence held by a 
competition authority after the closure of its proceedings. Regardless of whether the balance 
between effectiveness of public enforcement and effectiveness of private enforcement has been 
struck at the optimal point, co-ordination between public and private enforcement is necessary. 
Finally, this paper has identified a further Commission’s argument that could become a new 
justification for EU regulatory measures: overcoming some Member States’ legislative inertia in 
pursuing a certain policy (private enforcement, in the present case). This justification poses 
various problems. On the one hand, it is reasonable to allow Member States to develop new legal 
solutions in order to implement EU policies. This would be desirable in those technical areas like 
procedural law, which are difficult to harmonise. On the other hand, experience shows that not 
all Member States were prompt in putting in place measures designed to make effective the right 
to antitrust compensation. 
Striking a balance between these two aspects is a difficult exercise. How long should legislative 
inertia last before the Commission is entitled to take action? What if some Member States have 
already put in place measures designed to enforce a certain EU policy whereas others have not? 
Is it better to leave Member States their regulatory autonomy and to take EU measures at a later 
stage in order to deal with national regulatory failures that have been experienced and that impair 
the very EU policy that Member States were asked to enforce? It is submitted that the answers to 
such questions should be made on a case-by-case basis where the Commission should enjoy 
broad discretion.  
It has also been showed that subsidiarity presupposes a decision on the policy goals to be 
achieved and the relevant regulatory tools to achieve them. It has been argued that in areas 
related to an exclusive competence of the Union, these two assessments entail a high degree of 
policy discretion that should precede the identification of the level of regulatory intervention 
(European rather than national). Although the 2015 Better Regulation Guidelines hold that the 
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Commission should ask first why the EU should act and then what should be achieved, the 
opposite seems more appropriate: the first question is what policy goals should be accomplished 
and then whether an EU measure would bring an added-value.  
This paper confirmed that if the purpose of subsidiarity is to constrain the Commission’s action, 
then it raises too many expectations. Subsidiarity can call into question EU measures where it is 
evident that there is no EU added value and the Member States are already adequately addressing 
the problem identified by the Commission. Beyond this point, the assessments involved in the 
subsidiarity check remain largely discretionary. Finally, a more complete understanding of 
subsidiarity has been suggested. Rather than a principle designed to protect Member States’ 
regulatory autonomy, it should also be seen as an opportunity for the Member States to engage in 
the legislative process since the outset.  
 
